We analyze the equilibrium spread when the transaction size of informed traders is elastic in the value of private information (α). We show that the pooling equilibrium is likely to be inefficient when trade size is sensitive to α and the inefficient equilibrium can occur before the market breaks down. The pooling equilibrium spread does not monotonically increase with α, although it increases with the elasticity of informed trades to α. The upper bound of the elasticity of informed trades for the market to remain open for the active specialist is higher than the corresponding value for the passive specialist when the specialist has enough leverage over brokers.
Introduction
bring to light an important intermediary role of exchange specialists by showing that their long-term relationships with brokers help mitigate the effects of information asymmetry. The authors show that a specialist who actively differentiates between informed and uninformed traders through his long-term relationship with brokers can achieve equilibria that Pareto-dominate a pooling equilibrium in which he does not differentiate between the two types of traders. BMW provide an important insight that human intermediation is valuable in securities markets and the specialist system is a viable form of exchange markets.
BMW's paper has provided financial economists with theoretical foundations for a variety of empirical issues, including inter-market comparisons of execution quality (Huang and Stoll, 1996; Ve nkataraman, 2001) , specialist behavior (Madhavan and Sofianos, 1998; Kavajecz, 1999; Harris and Panchapagesan, 2005; Anand and Weaver, 2006) , the price impact of trades and price improvement (Chung, Chuwonganant, and McCormick, 2004) , and the informational efficiency of market quotes (Chung, Chuwonganant, and Jiang, 2008) .
BMW assume that the volume of liquidity trades is elastic in the cost of trading. Specifically, they assume that the volume of liquidity trades in each trading round depends on the absolute difference between the transaction price (i.e., the bid or ask price) and the security's intrinsic value.
However, BMW assume that informed traders are constrained by an aggregate position limit and thus always trade a fixed size. BMW hold that the latter assumption is necessary to rule out infinite demand for securities that otherwise would result from the assumption of risk neutrality.
In this study, we analyze how informed agents' trading behavior affects market equilibrium by 3 assuming that the transaction size of informed traders is elastic in the expected profit of trades.
Specifically, we assume that the transaction size of informed traders is a positive, linear function of the difference between the value of private information and the spread charged on their trades by the specialist. 1 The trading behavior of informed traders in our model is more in line with theoretical constructs and empirical evidence in prior studies than the one employed in BMW. For example, Easley and O'Hara (1987) examine the effect of trade size on stock prices. They show that trade size introduces an adverse selection problem into trading because informed traders, given that they wish to trade, prefer to trade large sizes at any given price. Consequently, market makers' pricing strategies depend on trade size, with large trades being executed at less favorable prices.
Our assumption on informed trading is also consistent with the one employed in Kyle (1985) . In Kyle (1985) , the informed traders want to trade aggressively, e.g., buying a large quantity if their information is positive. Although our model is similar in spirit to Kyle's model, it differs from his in that we neither assume that the market maker protects himself by setting a price that is increasing in the net order flow nor formulate the profit maximizing behavior of the informed trader per se. 2 Our model incorporates only the notion that informed traders submit larger orders when the value of their private information is greater. Reexamining the BMW model under an alternative, more realistic assumption on informed trading is important for at least two reasons. First, it would be interesting to find out whether the main results of the BMW model (derived under the restriction assumption that informed traders always trade a fixed size) can also be obtained when informed traders trade larger sizes when they have more 4 valuable information. Second, it would be interesting to find out whether the alternative assumption yields additional model implications.
As in BMW, we analyze the interaction between the specialist, broker, informed trader, and liquidity trader. We consider two types (i.e., passive and active) of specialists and consequently two types (i.e., pooling and separating) of equilibrium. We show that some of BMW's original results are robust to the behavior of informed traders. For example, we show that the result of BMW that the separating equilibrium Pareto-dominates the pooling equilibrium holds even when the transaction size of informed traders is elastic in the expected profit of trades. The specialist can allow more severe information asymmetry and both the uninformed and informed traders face more favorable trading terms in the separating equilibrium in which the specialist forces brokers to voluntarily disclose the type (i.e., informed vs. uninformed) of traders that they are representing. We also show that the power to sanction those who exploit private information can keep the market open and achieve an efficient equilibrium under conditions of severe adverse selection in which the pooling market would otherwise close if the active specialist has enough leverage over brokers.
More importantly, our model yields a number of new insights that are obscured by BMW's assumption that informed traders always trade a fixed size. First, we show that the pooling equilibrium is likely to be inefficient when trade size is highly sensitive to the value of private information (α) and the inefficient equilibrium can occur before the market breaks down. In contrast to BMW, the pooling equilibrium spread does not monotonically increase with α. The pooling equilibrium spread increases with α at the low level of α and then decreases as α becomes larger. The specialist narrows the spread as α becomes larger because greater expected losses to informed traders can be offset by greater revenues from liquidity traders. This result differs sharply from the result of 5 the BMW model that the pooling equilibrium spread increases monotonically with α. We also show that the pooling spread increases monotonically with α if liquidity trading is inelastic to trading cost and this positive relation reflects the specialist's need to curve information-based trading given fixed liquidity trading. Finally, we show that the upper bound of the elasticity of informed trades to the value of private information for the market to remain open for the active specialist is higher than the upper bound for the passive specialist if the specialist has enough leverage over brokers.
The model
We follow the basic setup and nomenclature of BMW. All traders have the same information initially and thus assign an identical intrinsic value, p * , to an asset. The only source of uncertainty is the possibility of a random shock to p * before a round of trade that becomes public information only after the trading round is completed. The random shock, which occurs with probability π, will lead to a revision of the asset's intrinsic value to either p * + α or p * -α, with each revision having equal probability.
The volume of liquidity trades is elastic in the cost of trading. Specifically, liquidity trading volume in each round depends on the absolute difference between transaction prices and the asset's intrinsic value (i.e., ask pricep * for buyer-initiated trades and p *bid price for seller-initiated trades) or one-half of the bid-ask spread charged on liquidity traders, S l . A stable proportion of informed traders learn of a shock to p * when it occurs. Thus with probability π, informed traders will participate in a round of trade. We assume that the trade size of informed traders depends on the value of private information. Informed traders learn of a shock to p * when it occurs and use its value α in their trading.
Specifically, we assume that the transaction size of informed traders increases with the difference 6 between α and the trading cost ( i s ) imposed on informed traders by the specialist.
Given the above setup, we now define the demand schedules of liquidity and informed traders as well as the revenue and cost functions of the specialist. As in BMW, the transaction size of liquidity traders ( l q ) is related to the spread ( l s ) in the following manner:
where * q is the transaction size of liquidity traders when the spread is zero and  denotes the sensitivity of liquidity trading to the spread. The transaction size of informed trades ( i q ) is assumed to be related to the net value of private information in the following manner:
where T denotes the sensitivity of informed trading to the value of private information ( ) net of trading cost ( i s ).
Because each liquidity trade crossed results in a net revenue of 2 l s for the specialist, the specialist's total revenue from liquidity trading,
(
The specialist anticipates informed buy orders for ) ( i s T   shares when good information is forthcoming and informed sell orders for ) ( i s T   shares when bad information is forthcoming. The cost per share to the specialist is the mispricing by net of the spread charged on the trades ( i s ). The total cost following a price shock is therefore
. Because the probability that information is forthcoming is π, the expected cost borne by the specialist in each period is
(4) 7
Equilibrium and the specialist
We consider two types of specialists who differ in their ability to distinguish informed traders from liquidity traders.
Equilibrium with a passive specialist
In this section, we consider a pooling equilibrium under the passive specialist system. This case is characterized by a passive specialist who, by definition, does not differentiate between informed and liquidity traders. The specialist uses an identical spread i l p s s s   for the two types of traders.
The equilibrium with the passive specialist is defined by a pooling spread, p s , for which the specialist's expected loss to informed traders is equal to the trading gain from liquidity traders.
Replacing l s and i s in equations (3) and (4) with p s , the zero-profit equilibrium condition becomes
By substituting equations (3) and (4) into equation (5), we obtain the following quadratic equilibrium equation:
Solving the quadratic equation yields two zero-profit spreads. See Figure 1 for a graphical illustration of the specialist's revenue and cost curves, together with two feasible spreads. Competition ensures that the equilibrium spread is the smaller of the two feasible spreads. If the specialist quotes a spread that is greater than α, the informed traders will not trade. As a result, the cost curve C(s) coincides with the horizontal axis for spreads greater than α. Therefore the pooling equilibrium spread
8 Equation (7) shows that the pooling spread is zero if  ,  , or T is zero, indicating that the non-zero pooling spread is a result of the informed traders' threat on the specialist. If the threat from informed traders is very large (i.e., either T or α is large, which means that informed trading is less restricted or the value of private information is large), the term under the square root of equation (7) can be negative. In such a case, the market will breakdown because the specialist cannot compensate himself with the revenue from liquidity traders. We now examine under which conditions the term under the square root is negative, i.e.,
Solving the above inequality in terms of T and α, respectively, yields the following conditions:
From (9) and (10), the ranges of α and T for which the market remains open are
To shed further light on the equilibrium spread, we show that the equilibrium spread may be efficient or inefficient, where inefficiency is defined as follows.
Definition. A pooling spread s p that satisfies (6) 
Lemma 1 in BMW characterizes the condition under which the pooling spread is inefficient, 9 / * q sp  . By definition, the equilibrium is inefficient if it occurs at a point for which ∂s i /∂s l > 0.
Applying this condition to
, we find that any spread larger than  2 / * max q s  , which maximizes the specialist's revenue, is inefficient. Because the specialist's revenue function is identical between our and BMW models, Lemma 1 applies to our model as well.
Using Lemma 1, we now restate Theorem 1 in BMW, which gives the condition for the pooling spread to be inefficient. By letting
Solving (11) in terms of α and T respectively, we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 1 shows that the pooling equilibrium is likely to be inefficient either when the value of private information is large relative to the revenue generated by liquidity trading (as measured by * q )
or when informed trading is highly sensitive to the value of private information (when T is large, i.e., informed trading is less restricted). This result expands BMW's Theorem 1 by explicitly incorporating the elasticity of informed trading with respect to the value of private information into model formulation.
Theorem 2 in BMW states that when there is nonzero probability of trade driven by private information, there always exist values of α for which a pooling equilibrium exists and is inefficient.
This implies that as the value of private information increases, the market first reaches an inefficient equilibrium, and then breaks down. The proof of Theorem 2 requires that the upper bound of α for the 10 market to remain open (i.e., the right-hand side of equation (9)) exceeds the upper bound of α for the efficient pooling equilibrium, i.e.,
Since the above inequality always holds, 4 the market will first reach an inefficient equilibrium before it breaks down as the value of the private information increases. Hence, BMW's Theorem 2 holds even when the size of informed trades increases with the value of private information.
We now examine whether the upper bound of T for the market to remain open (i.e., the right-hand side of (10)) exceeds the upper bound of T for the inefficient pooling equilibrium, i.e., The effect of model parameters on the pooling equilibrium spread
In this section we examine how the pooling equilibrium spread is related to model parameters.
The partial derivative of the equilibrium spread with respect to  is
The sign of (13) alternates from positive to negative at α = q*/δ, showing that the pooling equilibrium spread does not monotonically increase with α when the trade size of informed traders increases with α. 5 The specialist widens the spread as α increases at the low level of α (i.e., α < q*/δ). At α = q*/δ, the specialist charges the maximum possible spread,
Once α becomes larger than q*/δ, the specialist narrows the spread as α increases. The specialist narrows the spread as α increases because larger expected losses to informed traders can be offset by larger trading volume (and thus larger revenues) by (from) liquidity traders resulted from smaller spreads. This result differs sharply from the result of the BMW model. BMW show that the pooling equilibrium spread increases monotonically with α when informed trading is inelastic to α.
The partial derivative of the equilibrium spread with respect to  is simplified to the following expression if = 0:
Hence, the pooling spread increases monotonically with α if liquidity trading is inelastic to trading cost. Combined with the result in BMW, therefore, we conclude that the pooling spread increases 5 The value of α at which market breaks down is greater than the value of α at which s p reaches its maximum value. To see this point, note that
12 monotonically with α if either demand for liquidity trades is inelastic to trading costs (i.e., spread) or demand for information-based trading is inelastic to trading profits. The positive relation between s p and α in the former case reflects the specialist's need to curve information-based trading given fixed liquidity trading. The positive relation between s p and α in the latter case reflects the specialist's need to set a wider spread when faced with larger expected losses to informed traders, which will counterbalance the reduced revenue from liquidity based trading.
The partial derivative of the equilibrium spread with respect to T is
The intuition behind this result is simple. All else being equal, the specialist's loss to informed traders increases with the informed traders' trading sensitivity to the expected trading profit. Therefore, the specialist increases the spread as T increases.
The partial derivative of the equilibrium spread with respect to q* is
The spread decreases with an increase in the fixed liquidity trading volume. All else being equal, the larger fixed liquidity volume increases the specialist's revenue for any spread and allows the specialist to quote a narrower spread in equilibrium.
Equilibrium with an active specialist
As in BMW, we assume that an active specialist seeks to distinguish between informed and liquidity-motivated trades. Traders are represented by brokers and the specialist separates informed trades from liquidity-motivated trades to the extent that brokers are able to do so. The active specialist 13 differs from the passive one in several important ways. The active specialist may observe after the fact whatever information was available to the broker at the time of a trade. The active specialist may sanction brokers who misrepresented an informed trade as a liquidity trade. In addition, the active specialist can increase the value of broker's franchise by offering terms of trade that depend on the broker's representation of trading motive.
The optimization problem for the specialist, acting as a rational agent, is to quote a spread pair ) , ( l i s s that maximizes the broker's expected profits subject to the zero-profit constraint and to incentive-compatibility constraints that induce brokers to reveal their signals truthfully BMW (p. 75).
We identify the range of pairs that is consistent with potential equilibrium.
As in BMW, we call λ ( 1 5 . 0    ) the probability that the broker's inference about the nature of the trade is correct and assume that the probability of a correct inference is the same whether the trade is liquidity-or information-motivated. We further assume that with probability γ the specialist will observe the noisy signal the broker receives at the time of the trade. It is not relevant to our analysis whether the broker was correct; it matters only that there is some probability that the specialist can eventually infer whether the broker intended to be truthfully. 
The spread pair quoted by the specialist must also satisfy the following two incentive compatibility conditions. First, for a broker to reveal truthfully whether a trade is liquidity motivated, the liquidity spread cannot exceed the informed spread. This is the incentive compatible constraint for the brokers who are representing liquidity trading, l i s s  . ) ( l IC Second, for the brokers to truthfully disclose the informed trades, the threat by the specialist contingent on detection of intentional misrepresentation must exceed the benefit from doing so.
Following BMW (p. 77), we define the incentive compatible constraint for the brokers who are representing informed trading as
where N is the number of broker orders over some interval that will be treated by the specialist as information-motivated, C is the cost imposed by the specialist on brokers who misrepresented trade motives, and all other variables are the same as previously defined. Figure 2 given the value of λ as the informativeness of the broker's signal. This corresponds to expected liquidity spreads between s and s .
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Market breakdown condition
Substituting (14) and (15) into (19), and letting ) (IC i binding, the lower bound of l s (i.e., s) must satisfy the following condition
Solving equation (21) for s and taking the smaller root, we obtain:
From the above equation, the condition that must be satisfied for equilibrium to exist with an active specialist is
Inspection of (23) reveals that the upper bound of  for the market to remain open is
Comparing (24) 
Comparing (25) with (10) 
Hence our result shows that for a given set of parameters for which the passive specialist closes the market, the active specialist will always keep the market open if he has enough leverage (
The results in Section 4.2 of BMW's paper are valid in the extended setting. Lemma 2 and Theorem 3 in BMW remain valid in our model because they follow directly from the model setup.
Hence, the equilibrium value of e l s is in the set bounded by s < e l s < s and the expected spread faced by liquidity traders under an active specialist is always smaller than or equal to the spread set by a passive specialist. The ability to sanction those brokers who attempt to disguise the motives for trading gives the specialist the leverage necessary to weaken the adverse selection problem and thereby improve the terms of trade for liquidity traders. specialist's ability to improve the terms for liquidity traders is enhanced as the broker's ability to infer the motivation for a trade increases (i.e., ∂s/∂λ < 0). Also, the specialist's ability to differentiate between liquidity and informed traders improves the terms of trade for both traders. The spread quoted by a passive specialist is more likely to be inefficient when the information asymmetry is higher. Thus, the specialist's leverage over brokers is most likely to lead to better terms for informed traders when their information advantage is greatest. The ability to charge lower spreads to liquidity traders under higher informational asymmetry generates increased revenues that can be used to reduce the spread charged to informed traders.
Lemma 2 shows that the expected-spread pair under the active specialist will always be efficient as long as the pooling equilibrium spread is efficient. Theorem 5 in BMW shows that the active-specialist equilibrium could be efficient even when the pooling equilibrium is not if the specialist has enough leverage over brokers identified as having exploited private information. By setting s < s max and after simplification, it can be shown that market parameters that result in an inefficient equilibrium in a pooling environment will result in an efficient equilibrium is a separating environment if the specialist's ability to sanction brokers identified as having exploited private information satisfies the following condition: Thus the active specialist always produces Pareto-efficient terms of trade if he has enough leverage over brokers even when the volume of informed trades is elastic in trading profits. Benveniste, Marcus, and Wilhelm (1992) bring to light an important intermediary role of exchange specialists. They show that a specialist who distinguishes informed traders from uninformed traders achieves equilibrium that Pareto-dominates a pooling equilibrium in which he does not differentiate between the two types of traders. We extend their study by replacing its restrictive assumption that informed traders always trade a fixed size with a more reasonable assumption that informed traders buy/sell lager sizes when they have more valuable private information.
Conclusion
Our analyses show that although some of BMW's results remain valid under the alternative assumption, the assumption of inelastic informed trading obscures a number of other valuable implications of the model. By reformulating the model with a more reasonable assumption that the transaction size of informed traders is elastic in the expected profit of trades, we show that the model yields many more valuable insights. For example, we show that the pooling equilibrium spread does not monotonically increase with the value of private information. We also show that the pooling equilibrium spread increases with α if liquidity trading is inelastic to trading cost. We obtain several other interesting results that shed further light on the effect of informed trading on market liquidity. Fig. 1 . The passive specialist equilibrium. R(S) and C(S) are the revenue and cost curves of the specialist. s max is revenue maximized spread. Intersections of R(S) and C(S) determine solutions to the specialist's problem. However, competition requires that the smaller spread to be the feasible pooling spread. If the specialist quotes a spread that is greater than α, the informed traders will not trade. As a result, the cost curve C(s) coincides with the horizontal axis for spreads greater than α. pair for a given λ. Incentive compatible for liquidity trader requires that the equilibrium spread pair lie to the left of (IC l ). Incentive compatible for informed trader requires that the equilibrium spread pair lie to the right of (IC l ). Feasible solutions to the specialist's maximization problem for a given λ lie on S(λ), and thus are bounded by s , which represents the quoted spread liquidity spread for which (IC i ) is binding, and s , which is equivalent to the pooling spread. 
